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Abstract: 
This paper investigates the degree of exchange rate and oil prices pass-through to import 
prices, producer prices, and consumer prices in Canada and United States over the period from 
1980 to 2017 using a Structural Vector Auto-Regression (SV AR) model. The results indicate a 
robust evidence of a positive long-run correlation between exchange rate & oil prices and 
aggregate price levels. Impulse response function reveals a persistent and incomplete pass­
through for both exchange rates and oil prices i.e. 0.20 and 0.04 for Canada and 0.27 and 0.25 for 
the U.S. That is, greater pass-through exist in an economy which has a more oil import share, 
more volatile monetary policy, and higher inflation rate. Consistent with impulse response 
function, variance decomposition reveals that oil price shocks in the United States are the major 
cause of the variation in the import prices and producer prices, while exchange rate fluctuations 
explain more of the variation in consumer prices. However, in Canada, import prices are mainly 
explained by exchange rate fluctuations, while oil price shocks explain the variation in producer 
and consumer prices. 
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1. Introduction: 
Exchange rate and oil prices pass-through have long piqued the interest of economists 
and policymakers. The exchange rate pass-through could be defined as the percentage change in 
local currency import prices resulting from a one percent change in the exchange rate between 
the exporting and importing countries (Goldberg and Knetter, 1997). A change in import prices 
affects retail and consumer prices. While the pass-through rate of oil prices could be defined as a 
percentage response of domestic prices to a percentage increase in oil prices (Shioji and Uchino, 
2010). 
In an open economy such as Canada and United States, exchange rate movements and oil 
price shocks can have a material impact on prices, i.e. import prices, producer prices, and 
consumer prices. This is particularly important in the current context, with the depreciation of the 
Canadian dollar vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar, and the recent fluctuations in the oil prices. 
Oil is the second largest contributor to global primary energy consumption. BP's 
statistical Energy Outlook suggests that it will continue to play a similar rule until 2035. It is fair 
to argue that oil remains one of the biggest drivers of the global economy. Therefore, crude oil 
demand-supply dynamics critically influence general price level - a concern for global investors 
and importing and exporting countries. History presents numerous instance of crude oil price 
fluctuations. Whenever such fluctuations occurred, both oil rich and oil deficit countries faced 
challenges. Further, price fluctuations had far reaching consequences beyond demand-supply 
dynamics. 
Understanding of exchange rate pass-through to prices is of extreme importance for 
several reasons. First, the degree and timing of exchange rate pass-through is important for 
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understanding inflation dynamics, which is a key issue for central bank. Second, the degree of 
exchange rate pass-through affects the strength of the expenditure-switching effect, which is an 
important channel for the international transmission of country-specific shocks. 
This study applies a Structural Vector Auto-Regression model (SVAR). It is a 
methodology that was firstly proposed by Sims (1980) to determine the proportion of the price 
level variance that can be explained by the changes in oil prices and exchange rate in Canada and 
United States. The data used is over the period 1980: Ql to 2017: Q3. This is followed by an 
estimate of the pass-through rate for both exchange rate and oil prices movements. 
The paper is divided into four parts. In the first part, I review the studies that exploring 
the correlation between the degree of exchange rate and oil prices pass-through and overall 
prices level. After that, I present the recent shocks in global oil market. In the third part, I present 
the data set and the data properties. Then in the fourth part, I conduct the empirical analysis that I 
explain the methodology, model, and empirical results. 
2. Literature Review: 
Exchange rate pass-through, the degree to which exchange rate changes are passed on 
into aggregate prices, has long piqued the interest of economists and policymakers. A thorough 
understanding of exchange rate pass-through to aggregate prices is of extreme importance for 
several reasons. First, the degree and timing of exchange rate pass-through is important for 
understanding inflation dynamics, which is a key issue for central banks. Second, the degree of 
exchange rate pass-through affects the strength of the expenditure-switching effect, which is an 
important channel for the international transmission of country-specific shocks (An and Wang, 
2011). 
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The general literature distinguishes between direct and indirect channels through which 
changes in the exchange rate may be transmitted to consumer prices. As in Sanusi (2010), The 
direct channel of movements in the exchange rates on domestic prices is through prices of 
imported consumer goods or through domestically produced goods prices in foreign currency. 
While the indirect channel is through prices of imported intermediate goods as changes in the 
exchange rate may influence costs of production. While, Hyder and Shah (2004), say that the 
indirect channel of exchange rate pass-through refers to the competitiveness of goods in 
international markets. A depreciation of the exchange rate makes domestic products relatively 
cheaper for foreign buyers, and as a consequence exports and aggregate demand will rise and 
induce an increase in the domestic price level. 
The degree of pass-through falls within a wide range, starting from zero to complete 
pass-through. Yang ( 1997) states that the degree of pass-through is determined according to 
firms' behavior regarding the changes in exchange rate. Finns usually choose between keeping 
the mark-ups unchanged and preserving the level of the sales price, otherwise balancing both 
alternatives. Furthermore, the degree and speed of exchange rate pass-through differ from one 
country to another depending on several factors. It was argued, in the literature, that the size of 
the country, its exchange rate regime, degree of openness, and inflationary environment are the 
key macroeconomics determinants that influence the exchange rate pass-through (Helmy, Fayed, 
& Hussien). An and Wang (2011) find that a greater pass-through coefficient is associated with 
an economy with a smaller size, higher import share, more persistent and less volatile exchange 
rate, less stable monetary policy environment, higher inflation rate, and less volatile aggregate 
demand. 
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A strand of the literature studies exchange rate pass-through to import price index (IMP), 
producer price index (PPI), and consumer price index (CPI) in a unified framework, using vector 
autoregression (VAR) models. For instance, Hahn (2003), Ito et al. (2005), Choudhri and Hakura 
(2006), and McCarthy (2007), among others. These studies are based on the observation that a 
large of imports are intermediate goods that are used to produce final consumption goods. Final 
goods must also go through distribution processes before they consumed by households. IMP, 
PPI, and CPI partially reflect the prices of imports at different production and distribution stages. 
They find that shocks to prices at an earlier stage of production and distribution may affect prices 
at a later state, but not the other way around. For instance, they assume that shocks to IMP can 
affect PPI and CPI with one or more lags, while PPI and CPI shocks do not affect IMP directly. 
Contrarily, other studies, including Tandrayen-Ragoobur and Chicooree (2013) and Uddin, 
Quaosar, and Nandi (2014), found that the exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices is 
highest in Mauritius and Bangladesh, respectively. 
Empirical studies investigating the magnitude of the exchange rate pass-through are 
abound, albeit with much focus on industrialized countries, i.e. the Euro area, the United States 
and Japan. Surveys and discussions of the literature on the exchange rate pass-through are 
provided in Goldberg and Knetter (1997), and many others, including empirical studies such as 
McCarthy (2007), Gagnon and Ihrig (2004), Campa and Goldberg (2001), Choudhri and Hakura 
(2006), and Ito and Sato (2007), among others. In terms of estimation approaches, both the 
popular ordinary least squares (OLS) and vector autoregressive (VAR) approaches are used. The 
collective evidence can be summarized as follows. First, the degree and dynamics of exchange 
rate pass-through is incomplete, and the pass-through to import prices tends to be higher in both 
magnitude and speed than that to consumer prices. Secondly, estimates across countries and 
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estimates across studies for a particular country are significantly different and at time conflicting. 
Thirdly, there is a general decline in the degree of pass-through in the 1990s, majorly attributed 
to the low inflation environment achieved in most industrialized countries. 
Studies on the pass-through in developing countries are somewhat limited, although the 
few existing works tend to show similar results to those of industrialized countries. For example, 
Chaoudbri and Hakura (2006) find zero elasticity of exchange rate pass-through to inflation in 
Bahrain, Singapore, Canada and Finland. With regard to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries, 
Kiptui et al. (2005) using a vector error correction approach find incomplete pass-through in 
Kenya during the period 1972-2002. In particular, their results show that an exchange rate shock 
leads to a sharp increase in inflation that evens out after four quarters, with exchange rate 
accounting for 46 percent of inflation variance. Similarly, Chaoudhri and Hakura (2001) find 
exchange rate pass-through of 0.09 for Kenya, including 0.14 for Ghana, 0.02 for South Africa, 
0.06 for Zimbabwe, 0.16 for Burkina Faso and zero for Tunisia and Ethiopia. 
The price of oil is one of the most familiar economic indicators for many people as it is 
highly related to our daily economic activity. Therefore, changes in the oil price and their causes 
have been an interesting issue for economists. The instances where oil prices rise significantly in 
a short period of time, called oil shocks, are of particular interest (Bauch, 2011 ). 
Some of the earlier studies examining oil price shocks include Rasche and Tatom (1977), 
Mork and Hall (1980), and Hamilton (1983). As report in surveys by Balke et al, (2002), Jones et 
al, (2004), and Kilian (2008), the literature finds such consequences as rising oil prices, slower 
GDP growth and possible recession, higher unemployment rates, and higher price levels. 
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Contributions include Huntington (2003), Stock and Watson (2003), Congressional 
Budget Office (2006), Blanchard and Gali (2008), Edelstein and Kilian (2007), Segal (2007), and 
Herrera and Pesavento (2009), who mostly treat oil price shocks as exogenous. In contrast, an 
emerging literature explores the implications of treating oil price shocks as endogenous with 
sources that could include demand as well as supply, including Barsky and Kilian (2002, 2004), 
Bodenstein et al. (2007), Nakov and Pescatori (2007, 2010) and Kilian (2007, 2008, 2009). The 
differing sources of oil price shocks can explain the apparent instability of the relationship 
between oil prices and aggregate economic activity. Kilian (2008) maintains that most of the oil 
price gains after 1970 were the result of demand shocks; only the recession of 1980-1982 was the 
result of exogenous oil supply shocks; and exogenous supply shocks explain only a small 
fraction of the oil price increases during the 1973-1974, 1990-1991, and 2002-2003 episodes. 
Kilian (2009) identifies oil price shocks as variously arising from shocks to crude oil supply, 
global demand, and precautionary demand and then uses a vector autoregressive model to show 
that the different sources of shocks have substantially differential effects on U.S. GDP and 
consumer prices. 
How do domestic prices of goods and services respond to changes in world crude oil 
prices? Several authors have documented declines in the "pass-through rate" of oil prices -
defined as percentage responses of domestic prices to a percentage increase in oil prices - both 
for the U.S. and elsewhere in the world. This finding is considered to be important, not only for 
the relevance of the subject per se, but also because it is believed to have great influence on how 
we understand working of our nation economies (Shioj i and Uchino, 2010). 
Early works generally employed production functions to investigate the effects of 
changes in oil prices on an aggregate economy e.g. Hamilton (1 983, 1985) and Gisser and 
1 1  
Goodwin (1986). Each study finds a negative association between energy prices and output. 
Hooker (1996) find that, in the United States, the negative relationship between oil prices and 
GDP weakened after 1973 by examining the period 1984: 1-1994:2. In addition, Hooker (1999) 
pointed out that oil price changes would not appear to have a strong impact on the U.S. core 
inflation after 1980. 
The main limitation of these previous works that they assumed exogeneity of oil price 
changes: the possibility of reverse causality from the global economy through oil demand 
fluctuations has not been taken into consideration. To address the exogeneity problem, Kilian 
(2009) establish the structural VAR model of the global oil market in order to identify three 
underlying shocks in the global oil market: l )  oil supply shocks; shocks to the physical ability to 
produce oil, 2) aggregate demand shocks; shocks to the current demand for all industrial 
commodities which are determined by global macroeconomic conditions and 3) oil-specific 
demand shocks; shocks which cannot be explained based on oil supply shocks or aggregate 
demand shocks. Then he reaches a conclusion that each oil price shock affects GDP growth and 
CPI in the United States differently. 
Following this contribution, the structural VAR model has been widely applied to the 
later studies investigating oil-related economic issues. For example, Kilian and Park (2009) 
construct a two-block structural VAR model that included the global oil market block and the 
U.S. stock market block in order to explore the differences in the responses of industry-level 
stock returns to changes in oil price. In addition, Fukunaga et al. (2010) investigate the impacts 
of oil price shocks on industry-level production in the United States and Japan and found that 
each shock would differently affect each industry-level production depending on oil 
intensiveness, and the transmission mechanism would be different between both countries. 
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Looking at country coverage of the previous work, however, most empirical literatures 
have mainly focused on the effects of changes in oil price on the developed economy and the 
effects of changes in oil price on the developing countries are largely unknow. However, 
(Sakashita and Y oshizaki, 2016) investigate the effects of oil price shocks on the production and 
price level in five emerging countries through comparison with the United States, using a two­
block structural VAR model of the global crude oil market proposed by Kilian and Park. Their 
main findings are that the effect of oil price shocks on the index of production (IIP) and 
consumer price index (CPI) in emerging countries also depends on where the changes 
fundamentally come from (this is also the case for the United States). They also find that some 
emerging countries show unique impulse response patterns, the shapes of which are different 
from those of the United States and there are differences in impulse response patterns among 
emerging countries. 
3. Oil and the World Economy: 
Oil is the second largest contributor to global primary energy consumption. BP's 
Statistical Energy Outlook suggests that it will continue to play a similar role until 2035. It is fair 
to argue that oil remains one of the biggest drivers of the global economy. Therefore, crude oil 
demand-supply dynamics critically influence general price levels - a concern for global investors 
and importing and exporting countries. History presents numerous instances of crude oil price 
fluctuations. Whenever such fluctuations occurred, both oil rich and oil deficient countries faced 
challenges. Further, price fluctuations had far reaching consequences beyond demand-supply 
dynamics. 
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Crude oil is one of the most widely traded commodities in the world, and its price is 
exposed to many variables. Some of the major contributors to oil price fluctuations include (Kar 
et al, 2017): 
I. Demand-Supply dynamics: During 2010-2014, a spike in oil price could be attributed to 
many factors, including a supply crunch from the conventional oil fields. A rise in price 
resulted in higher earnings for upstream companies and investors. Consequently, the 
surplus funds were used to develop unconventional sources like shale and tight oil. 
Successful exploration and commercial production of unconventional sources pushed the 
price of conventional oil downward. A price trend of oil from 1986 to 2017 is shown in 
Figure 1 .  
II. Growth of world economy: Growth of the global economy is linked to energy sources, 
and oil has a significant link to global growth. Growth in energy-intensive industries 
pushes energy demand. In a sense, demand for oil is dependent on the growth of many 
sectors, including manufacturing, electricity, transportation, and shipping. Higher growth 
of global economy translates to higher demand of energy products. 
III. Monetary and fiscal policies: Monetary and fiscal po lies of various countries/trading 
blocs; especially the US, European Union, Japan, and China impact the flow of capital, 
investment, and demand for oil. All influence the price of crude oil in the global market. 
For instance, an increase in US dollar interest rates may negatively affect oil industry 
investments because the cost of capital will rise. 
IV. OPEC policy: OPEC countries supply more than 30% of the global crude oil demand. In 
2017, it is projected that out of total crude demand of 95.6 million barrels/day, the OPEC 
countries will supply 32.1  million barrels/day-33.6% of total demand. Therefore, OPEC 
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policy on oil production plays a critical role in the balancing of demand and supply. A 
decision to cut production with effect from January 2017 may help prices move upward. 
V. Geo-political events: History shows evidence of geopolitical events affecting the price of 
crude oil. Geopolitical events often lead to output loss, supply disruption, and 
inefficiency in market functioning, resulting in oil price fluctuations. One example is the 
Arab Spring, which pushed oil prices higher in 2011-12. 
VI. Appreciation of US dollar: Across the globe, oil trade is done through benchmark 
currency, the US dollar. Appreciation of the US dollar makes oil more expensive for 
importing nations outside the US and they have to sell out more. This may lead to 











Figure 1: Oil Production and Prices 
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Over the past 30 years, there have been five major declines in the price of the crude that 
have hit world markets starting dates: June 1986, October 1990, October 1997, May 2002, and 
June 2008. 
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The stunning fall in oil prices, from a peak of $115 per barrel in June 2014 to under $35 
at the end of February 2016, has been one of the most important global macroeconomic 
developments of the past 20 months. The sharp fall is broadly similar in magnitude to the decline 
in 1985-1986, when OPEC members reversed earlier production cuts, and in 2008-2009 at the 
outset of the global financial crisis. Understanding the underlying causes of price drops is 
essential to interpreting their macroeconomic effects. The 1985-86 decline was mainly supply­
driven, while the drop in 2008-2009 was almost entirely due to a collapse in demand. The recent 
price decline appears to be a mix of the two (Rogoff, 2016). 
The significant decline in the price of oil over the past year is a function of both supply 
and demand side factors (Johnston, 2015). 
On the supply side, one of the biggest changes in recent years has been the increased 
production coming from the U.S., especially from new shale oil producers. With U.S. shale oil 
leading the growth of global supply, U.S. domestic production has almost doubled in the past six 
years. According to data from the EIA, global crude oil supply increased 3.5 million barrels per 
day from 2005-2014, but if we were to subtract U.S. shale oil production from the equation, then 
overall supply would have declined by about one million barrels per day over the same time 
frame. 
Weak demand is the other factor driving prices lower. While the second quarter of 2015 
saw global oil supply at 96.39 million barrels a day, global demand was only at 93.13 million 
barrels per day. The slow recovery for many countries from the global financial crisis, especially 
European countries, has contributed to weaker demand. 
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One of the most significant changes however is the slower growth in China, the 
world's largest net importer of oil. Having grown at an average of 10% per year since around 
1980 for almost 30 years, China's growth has slowed to about 8% per year since 201 1 and is 
likely to be less than its 7% growth target for this year. 
Another significant point concerning low oil prices relates to OPEC and especially Saudi 
Arabia's traditional role of global "swing" producer. Traditionally, the cartel and its most 
influential member, the largest oil-exporting nation of Saudi Arabia, have cut production to boost 
sagging oil prices. But, with the massive increase in the supply coming from the U.S., OPEC 
member countries have kept production up in order to maintain market share. While Saudi 
Arabia is affected by the lower oil prices, the country is suffering less than many other nations, 
including some OPEC member nations. We now turn to see which nations are most affected. 
The strong U.S. dollar has been the main driver for the price decline of crude oil over the 
last few years. In fact, the dollar is  at a 1 2-year high against the euro, leading to appreciations in 
the U.S. dollar index and a reduction in oil prices. This puts the market under a lot of pressure, 
because when the value of the dollar is strong, the value of commodities falls. Global 
commodity prices are usually in dollars and fall when the U.S. dollar is strong (Tarver, 
2015). 
Significant price volatility in global energy markets is of interest to policy-makers, given 
the impact that unanticipated movements in energy prices can have macroeconomic 
performance. 









Figure 2: Timeline of Oil Markert Episodes since 1980 
----- Oil Price - Percent Change 
Figure 2 presents the evolution of the real oil price along with key oil market events in 
the period 1980 to 2016. As follows from the figure, it is possible to identify three distinct but 
interrelated oil price intervals throughout: (1) the 1990-1999 price depression around $29/bbl.; 
(2) the 2000-2010 price surge, during which the price of oil had risen on average by 109% 
($62/bbl.), from its average value in the 1990s; and (3) the 2011-2014 price stability close to 
$110/bbl. The latter was followed by the 2014 oil price collapse, during which prices fell by 73% 
to $48/bbl. in January 2015, down from $111/bbl. in June 2014. 
Three important observations follow throughout the entire period. First, the oil price has 
shown significant volatility, while there is no obvious long run trend (upward or downward). 
Second, the one geopolitical event throughout the entire period that produced the most 
significant increase in the price of oil was the Gulf War in 1990, during which the oil price 
spiked by 53% during three months (August to October 1990). During the rest major geopolitical 
episodes, namely the 2002-2003 Venezuelan crisis and Iraq War (13%) and following the events 
of the 2011 Arab Uprisings (35%) the oil price increases were only modest due to the offsets by 
gains in oil production elsewhere. Third, several other oil market-specific events produced larger 
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and comparable price shocks related to the underlying supply and demand conditions, i.e. the 
1999-2000 strong global industrial growth (77%), the great commodities surge of 2003-2008 
(1 45%), the Global Financial Crisis of2008 (-1 02%) and the oil market imbalance of2014-201 5  
(-73%) (Economou, 2016). 
Table 1 summarizes the key contributing factors of oil price shocks at certain 
chronological oil market events along with estimates of the rate of the positive or negative oil 
price changes. Many of these episodes were associated with supply shocks arising out of 
geopolitical conflicts, even though their frequency and amplitude have been progressively in 
decline through time. Demand specific shocks had become increasingly important contributors in 
the late 1990s and are primarily associated with major global economic expansions and 
contractions. Moreover, there is a strong presence of precautionary demand shocks in several 
episodes that reflect shifts in the demand for oil associated with the forward-looking behavior of 
the market participants. Nevertheless, episodes that are associated with market imbalances, i.e. 
positive shifts in the demand for oil confronted by limited oil supply response and with strong 
supply growth confronted by stagnant demand, produced the most substantial oil price shocks by 
historical standards. It follows that neither of the market fundamentals can be an important 
determinant per se, but it is rather the catalytic interaction of both supply and demand that has 
historically driven the real oil price (Economou, 2016). 
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Table 1 :  Summa Factors of Historical Oil Price Shocks 
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4. The Data and Their Properties 
demand shock 
demand shock 
The choice of the SV AR model depends on the time series. Therefore, before turning to setup the 
model, in section 1 the data set is presented and in section 2 the data properties are discussed. 
4.1 The Data Set: 
The choice of the variables is based on the following consideration. The analysis aims at 
capturing the effects of changes in oil prices and exchange rates on import prices, producer 
prices, and consumer prices. Thus, the corresponding variables included in the model. Moreover, 
the study aims to estimate the exchange rate pass through, and to estimate the oil price pass 
through. To estimate the oil price pass through, I calculate the changes on oil inflation and 
producer prices. And to estimate the exchange rate pass through, I calculate the changes on 
consumer price, real effective exchange rate, and foreign consumer prices. 
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The analysis is based on quarterly data covering the period 1980: Q 1 to 2017: Q3. A 
detailed account of the data used as well as the data sources is given in Table 2 in Appendix A. 
In short, the oil price is represented by a global price of Brent crude denominated in U.S. Dollars 
per barrel. The exchange rate is the real effective exchange rate for each country. The output gap 
is calculated by subtracting the potential GDP from the actual GDP. Furthermore, import prices, 
producer prices in manufacturing, and the consumer prices are considered. Finally, the 3-Month 
or 90-day rates and yields; Interbank Rates are used to model monetary policy. 
4.2 The Data Properties: 
In order to assess the time series properties of the data unit root tests are performed. The 
results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test is summarized in Table 3. The test indicates 
that Oil Prices (oil,), Exchange Rates (reer1), Interest Rates (i,), Import Prices Index (imPt), 
Producer Prices Index (ppi,), Gross Domestic Product (GDP,), and Output Gap (gaPt) are 
integrated of order one, I ( 1 ), while the inflation ( 7t1) is a stationary series. 
Table 3:  Unit Root Test 
Test Statistic 
Variables Canada United States 
Level I 510ifference Level I 51Difference 
Oil Prices - 1 .542 -8.220 -1 .542 -8.220 
REER -2.228 -9.781 - 1 .754 -9.659 
Inflation -4.627 -1 1 . 145 
Interest Rate - 1 .756 -9.834 -2.008 -10.014 
IMP - 1 .3 1 6  -7.208 - 1 .2 1 6  -8.156 
PPI -0.9 1 8  -7.604 -0.337 -8. 1 0 1  
Output Gap -2.104 -6.257 4.372 -6.749 
GDP 
Note: Critical values for the test statistics are: -3.5 at I% -2.9 at 5%, and -2.6 at 1 0% 
To estimate the Structural Vector Autoregressions (SY AR), it is important to establish 
the order of the integration of the series involved and then select the optimal lag length of the 
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SV AR model, which should be high enough to ensure that the errors are approximately white 
noise, but also small enough to allow estimation. The lag lengths to estimate the SV AR model 
are chosen by minimizing the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). One lag of the first 
differenced series is used in the estimation of the SVAR model for Canada. While four lags are 
used for the estimation of the model for United States. These lag lengths minimize AIC of the 
SVAR. Table 4 in Appendix A reports the AIC for different lags for all countries' models. 
Table 4: AIC for Different Lag Estimation of SVAR Model 
Lags Canada USA 
0 14. 15  26.40 
I 1 2.61 * 25.80 
2 1 2.96 25.85 
3 1 3 .08 26.04 
4 12.88 25.62* 
S. The Empirical Analysis: 
The main objective of this paper is to estimate and analyze the responsiveness of Canada 
and United States overall prices level to Exchange rate and oil price shocks. The analysis follows 
the recent empirical studies utilizing a SV AR model, drawing on Bemanke (1986) and Sims 
(1980). 
One of the main shortcomings of the unrestricted VAR (UV AR) approach is the 
difficulty of interpreting the impulse responses. This is because the choice of the Cholesky 
decomposition in the UV AR is  not unique given the number of alternative sets of orthogonalized 
impulse responses which can be obtained from any estimated VAR model. When we perform 
impulse-response analysis, we ask the question, "What is the effect of a shock to one equation, 
holding all other shocks constant?" To analyze that impulse, we need to keep other shocks fixed. 
But if the error terms are correlated, then a shock to one equation is associated with shocks to 
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other equations; the thought experiment of holding all other shocks constant cannot be 
performed. The solution is to write the errors as a linear combination of "structural" shocks. 
Sim's (1 980) own approach of circumventing this problem by choosing an orthogonalization -
typically imposing causal ordering on the VAR has not been fully accepted in the literature. In 
the absence of such restrictions, the orthogonalized impulse responses are difficult to interpret, 
so that the estimated model gives few meaningful insights into the economic system that it 
represents. The SVAR approach builds on Sim's approach but attempts to identify the impulse 
responses by imposing a priori restrictions on the covariance matrix of the structural errors 
and/or long-run impulse responses themselves (Bwire et al., 2013). 
5.1 Methodology 
The analysis is conducted by using a Structural VAR model to analyze the 
interrelationships between exchange rate and oil price shocks and overall prices level in Canada 
and United States during the period of 1980 to 2017. The structural VAR model depends on 
economic theory rather than Cholesky decomposition to recover structural innovations from 
residuals ofreduced-form VAR. One likely drawback of the Cholesky approach is that in cases 
where the covariance between innovations is empirically non-zero, the common component of 
the disturbances will be arbitrary attributed to the first variable in the recursive VAR. This 
renders the reported impulse response functions (IRFs) and variance decompositions (VD) 
highly sensitive to the ordering of the variable in the VAR. Such VAR model has been criticized 
as devoid of any economic content (Helmy et al). 
In matrix form following Hamilton (1 994), the SV AR model can be written as: 
Bo X1= P1 X1.1 + P2X1-2 + . . . .  + PpX1-p + µ1 (1) 
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Where X1 is a vector of n endogenous variables, the matrix Po is of order n*n and describes the 
contemporaneous relationships between the variables, µ,is the (unobserved) vector of structural 
shocks of order N* 1, and E1 is a white noise error term. The white noise errors mean that the 
structural disturbances are serially uncorrelated such that Elµ1 µ1'1= D, where D is a diagonal 
matrix. 
By multiplying equation ( I )  by an inverse matrix Po·1 , I obtain the reduced form of the VAR 
model of the dynamic structural model as in equation (2). It must be noted that this adjustment is 
necessary because the model given in equation ( l )  is not directly observable and structural 
shocks cannot be correctly identified. 
Where µ,is a n* l vector of serially uncorrelated structural disturbances of the model and is 
obtained as follows: 
To estimate a SVAR model and obtain the impulse response functions (IRFs) and variance 
decompositions (VDs), it is necessary to use the structural shocks, µ,, and not the forecast errors, 
E1. These innovations are a linear combination of serially independent structural shocks, µ1. So, 
the idea of structural decomposition is to take the observed values of E1 from an empirical VAR 
and restrict the system to recover µ1 (Helmy et al.). 
The variance-covariance matrix is given by: 
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To generate the structural shocks, I use a Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance 
matrix of the reduced form VAR residuals n. Since the estimation of the SV AR model has K2 
more parameters than the VAR, in order to find a unique solution, I require both the order 
condition and the rank condition to be satisfied. The order condition requires that the number of 
parameters in the matrices Po and D should be less than the number of free parameters in the 
matrix n. Since Q is a symmetric matrix, then the number of free parameters of the matrix Q is 
defined by k(k+ 1 )/2, where k is the number of endogenous variables included in the system. 
Assuming that D is a diagonal matrix, then Po can have no more free parameters than: k(k-1 )/2. I 
can impose two different restrictions on matrix Po. The first is the normalization restriction that 
aims to assign the value of I to variables Xtj in each of the jlh equation. And the second is the 
exclusion restriction that aims to assign zero to some variables in the equation. These restrictions 
are defined by the theoretical model (Bwire et al., 2013). 
5.2 The Baseline Model 
The data used in the SV AR model consists of quarterly observations, covering the period 
from 1980(Q 1) to 201 7(Q3). Referring to the variable of interest for my analysis and taking into 
account their unit root properties, the variables included in the model are the first difference of 
the log of oil prices (6oilt) that used to capture supply shocks, interest rate (6it) is included to 
allow for potential effects of monetary policy, output gap (6gaPt) or gross domestic product 
(6GDPt) is used to capture demand shocks, exchange rate (6reert), import prices index (6imp1), 
producer prices index (6ppi1), and the level of the Inflation (7t1). 
The ordering of the variables indicated by the vector of endogenous variables X1 = (6oilt, 6it, 
6gap1, 6reer1, 6imp1, 6ppi1, 7t1). Imposing the restrictions suggested by the theoretical model, and 
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using this ordering in the Cholesky decomposition the relationship between the error terms of the 
reduced form, Et, and the structural disturbances (shocks), µt , of the model can be written as in 
equation (1). 
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Where Utoil denotes the oil price (supply) shock, Uti is the interest rate (monetary) shock, u1gap is 
the output gap (demand) shock, u{eer is the real exchange rate chock, u1imp is the import prices 
shock, Utppi is the producer price shock, and Ut11 is the inflation shock. Therefore, according to my 
theoretical model, the matrix p has 21 free parameters to estimate. This recursive identification 
scheme is based on Ito and Sato (2007), Hahn (2003) and McCarthy (2000), and implies that the 
identified shocks contemporaneously affect their corresponding variables and those variables that 
are ordered at a later stage but have no impact on those that are ordered before. 
In p matrix entries with given values are assumed to be fixed. I have restricted the diagonals of 
the matrix to unity, set elements above the main diagonal to zero, and allow the elements below 
the main diagonal to be estimated. 
In the resulting P matrix in the system in equation (5), it is reasonable to order the most 
exogenous variables first. The pump price of crude oil is exogenous to the domestic economy, so 
oil price shocks are modelled as independent of shocks to other variable in the system. Given the 
26 
set up in equation (5), this amounts to a set of six restrictions, since the restriction imposes zero 
on the 2"d, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th elements of its first row. 
In the second row, I have five additional restrictions based on the assumption that the shocks to 
the interest rate are influenced by shocks to the pump price of crude oil and independent of 
shocks to all other variables in the system. That is, the output gap, exchange rate, import prices, 
producer prices, and inflation are assumed to have no contemporaneous effects on the interest 
rate. This is equivalent to imposing zero restrictions on the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th elements of the 
second row in the matrix. 
Shocks to the output gap are assumed to be influenced by shocks to the pump price of crude oil 
and shocks to the interest rate. Exchange rate, import prices, producer prices, and inflation are 
assumed to have no contemporaneous effect on the output gap. This assumption adds two more 
restrictions, and its equivalent to imposing zero restrictions on the 4th, 5th, 61h, and 7th elements of 
the third row in the matrix. 
I also assume that shocks to the exchange rate are influenced by shocks to the pump price of 
crude oil, shocks to the interest rate and shocks to the output gap. In this case, import prices, 
producer prices, and inflation are assumed to have no contemporaneous effect on the exchange 
rate. This assumption forms the 5th, 6th, and 7th elements of the fourth row in the matrix. 
In the fifth row I assume that shocks to the import prices are influenced by shocks to pump price 
of crude oil, shocks to the interest rate, shocks to output gap, and shocks to exchange rate. In this 
case, producer prices, and inflation are assumed to have no contemporaneous effect on the 
import prices. This assumption forms the 6th and 7th elements of the fifth row in the matrix. 
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Shocks to the producer prices are assumed to be influenced by shocks to pump price of crude oil, 
shocks to the interest rate, shocks to output gap, shocks to exchange rate, and shocks to the 
import prices. In this case, inflation is assumed to have no contemporaneous effect on producer 
prices. This assumption forms the 7th element of the sixth row in the matrix. Finally, shocks to 
domestic inflation are ordered last because they are assumed to be influenced by shocks to all 
variables in the system. 
5.3 The Empirical Results 
5.3. 1 .  Impulse Response Function of Oil Prices Shock for Canada and United States: 
I use the impulse response functions from oil price shocks to investigate the response of 
import prices, producer prices, and consumer prices. Figure 3 shows the impact of a one standard 
deviation shock, defined as exogenous, unexpected, temporary in the oil price with a 95 percent 
confidence level on the pricing chain (import prices, producer prices, and consumer prices) in 
Canada and United States. The solid line is the estimated response while the dashed lines denote 
a two-standard error confidence band around the estimate. 
Figure 3: Impulse Response Function of Oil Prices Shock 
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Table 5: Impulse Response Function of Oil Prices Shock 
Canada United States 
Step IMP PPI CPI IMP PPI CPI 
0 0.713 0.198 0.079 1 .860 1 .798 0.108 
I -0.081 0.106 0.014 1 .868 2.028 0.125 
2 -0.042 0.005 0.001 0.396 0.793 0.062 
3 0.075 0.001 -0.004 -0.249 0.120 0. 135  
4 0.041 0.013 0.002 -0.648 -0.501 0.010 
5 -0.010 0.007 0.002 -0.812 -1 .095 -0.018 
6 -0.0 1 4  0 0 -0.385 -0.618 -0.074 
7 0 0 0 0.3 19 0.264 0.071 
8 0 0 0 0.412 0.486 0.0 1 7  
9 0 0 0 0.045 0.035 0.022 
10 0 0 0 -0.167 -0. 164 -0.063 
1 1  0 0 0 0.059 0.051 0.038 
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It is clear from figure 3 that the effect of an oil price shock on import prices in Canada 
and United States is immediate positive effect from the first quarter. Based on the numbers in 
Table 5, the immediate effect of a structural one standard deviation shock of oil prices shock to 
import prices in Canada is about 0.71 increase in the import prices level, and in the United States 
is about 1.86 increase in the import prices level. 
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Economic theory argues that an increase in oil prices might have an inflationary effect in 
at least four ways. First, because energy prices represent a portion (sometimes considerable) of 
production costs. Second, because it might lead to higher inflation expectations. Third, because it 
might lead workers to demand a higher wage to compensate for the increase in energy prices 
(Blanchard and Gali, 2008). And fourth, because it might mimic an adverse supply shock if real 
wages do not decrease sufficiently thus triggering an adjustment in employment. By contrast, an 
increase in oil prices might have a deflationary effect in the same fashion as an adverse demand 
shock because higher energy prices tend to reduce net-disposable income, and thus consumption 
and investments (Edelstein and Kilian, 2007 & Conflitti and Luciani, 2017). 
My results indicate that the import prices response to oil shocks in U.S. is more than 
double relative to Canada. Although both are neighbors and industrial countries, this is not 
surprising for a main reason. Basically, Canada is an oil exporting country while U.S. is an 
importing one. As a result, an increase (or decrease) in the price of oil will be more reflected in 
the U.S. import prices (which include oil) than Canada's import prices, which has absolutely to 
oil or gas imports. Thus, an increase in oil prices increases the imports' bill for U.S. not for 
Canada. 
Moreover, it is shown from the figure 4 that the pass-through in Canada is larger for IMP 
than for the PPI and CPI, where the immediate effect of a structural one standard deviation shock 
of oil price shock to producer prices is about 0.20 increase in the producer prices level, and to 
consumer prices is about 0.08 increase in the consumer prices level. 
Although Canada is a net oil exporter, the immediate impact of oil shock on import prices 
is positive. That is, the influence on Canada's terms of trade caused by the partially offset by 
lowering consumers' disposable incomes and spending power through high oil prices at the 
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pump. Thus, higher oil prices will have net negative effect. This negative effect will work its 
way through the economy through two channels: first, it will give consumers less disposable 
income, which they can spend on goods and services; second, it will increase input costs and 
discourage production in sectors other than oil, especially energy-intensive sectors (Millington, 
2016). 
Lower oil prices are typically accompanied by a weaker Canadian dollar. For example, 
the Canadian currency depreciated when oil prices dropped in 1985-1986. The Lonnie dropped 
in values from 85 cents US in 1980 to 7 1  cents US in 1986, when the oil prices reached their 
cyclical low. So, the biggest economic change to Canada as a result of lower oil prices has been 
the corresponding decline in the Canadian dollar. A sudden oil price drops increase uncertainty 
in oil sector investment and in the other goods producing sectors. Throughout the economy, 
capital investment is reduced or delayed, and overall growth is diminished. 
Although oil price drops increase uncertainty in oil sector investment, Canadian 
consumers clearly benefit from lower oil prices via lower fuel costs. According to Ferley et al. 
(2015), over the first half of 2014, Canadian consumers purchased roughly $48.5 billion of motor 
fuel, at an annualized rate Table 6. Based on their own estimates of the rate of pass-through of 
lower oil prices into gasoline prices, a 30% drop in oil prices typically would be reflected in 
about an 18% drop in gasoline prices. That represents a savings of $8.9 billion on the consumer's 
motor vehicle fuel bill, all else held equal. 
Well publicized concerns about the impact of lower prices on the Canadian economy, 
high household debt levels, as well as recent volatility in equity markets, could cause households 
to remain more cautious than normal about spending that windfall; however, even making the 
very conservative assumption that households spend only half these savings on other goods 
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implies an additional $4.4 billion in consumer spending in 2015 due to the drop-in energy costs. 
Assuming a 35% import content for this new consumer spending leaves a net add to GDP of 
about $2.9 billion, or about 0.1 percentage points, from increased consumer spending. 
Importantly, this increase in spending does not require households to take on additional debt. In 
fact, the assumptions above actually imply an increase in the share of disposable income that is 
being saved. The boost to the volume of consumer spending reflects purely the fact that 
households can purchase a greater volume of goods and services with the same amount of money 
(Ferley et al., 2015). 
Table 6: Oil Prices and Canadian Consumer Spending 
based on assumed 30% drop in oil prices 
$ Billions (C$) 
HI I 14  Spending on motor fuel 48.5 
Savings from lower oil prices 8.9 
Amount saver than soent* 4.4 
Increased spending 4.4 
Imoorted content** 1 .6 
Net impact on GDP 2.9 
Percent of GDP 0.1  
*Assumes that just 50% of savings from lower gasoline prices are 
spent. 
**Import content of new consumer spending assumed to be 35%. 
Based on BOC Review, Autumn 2005. 
Source: Statistics Canada, RBC Economics Research 
The collapse in oil prices has led to a major short-term drop in investment in the oil 
industry, with global investment in production and exploration falling from $700 billion in 2014 
to $550 billion in 2015, with spill-over to energy commodities. Sharp declines in investment in 
other commodity sectors have also contributed to overall slow global growth (Rogoff, 2016). 
The main conclusion with respect to the Canadian economy is that a rise in consumer 
spending and exports has the capacity to more than fully offset a likely drop in business 
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investment, where the first casualty of lower oil prices is likely to be weaker investment in the oil 
and gas extraction sector - approximately 30% drop in oil prices in 2015, be expected to reduce 
business investment in the oil and gas extraction sector by around 3% in 2015 - (Ferley et al., 
2015). 
It is important to keep in mind that the Canadian economy is more than just oil and gas 
extraction. As shown in Table 7, investment in the oil & gas extraction and closely-related 
industries together accounted for more than a third of business investment in Canada in 2013; 
however, that still amounts to a smaller 5% share of GDP since business investment itself 
accounts for about 13% of all GDP. Moreover, the import content of Canadian equipment 
investment is typically quite high, suggesting that a portion of any decline in business investment 
will be reflected in weaker import growth rather than weaker domestic production. Accounting 
for import content, a 3% drop in investment in the oil & gas extraction sector would subtract 
around 0.1 ppts from Canadian GDP growth. Assuming a much larger decline of 10% in 
investment would still subtract a relatively modest 0.3 ppts from GDP growth in 2015 (Ferley et 
al., 2015). 
Table 7: Canada Investment in the Oil and Gas Extraction Sector in 20 1 3  
% of Private 
$ Bill ions Non-Residential Investment % ofGDP 
Oil and gas extraction 76.3 30.3 4.0 
Suooort activities for manufacturing oil and gas 5.4 2.2 0.3 
Petroleum and coal manufacturing 1 .8  0.7 0.1 
Pipeline transportation 6.7 2.7 0.4 
Total 90.2 35.9 4.8 
Source: Statistics Canada, RBC Economic Research 
From figure 5, it is shown that the pass-through in United States is larger for PPI than 
IMP from QO to Q4, after that the pass-through is larger for IMP than the PPI, and for the CPI it 
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is larger from the first quarter. The immediate effect of a structural one standard deviation shock 
of oil price shock to producer prices is about 1 .80 increase in the producer prices level, and to 
consumer prices is about 0. 108 increase in the consumer prices level. 
Oil price changes have been viewed traditionally as cost shocks or productivity shocks to 
oil-importing countries. The price of oil influences the costs of production and manufacturing 
across the United States. For example, there is the direct correlation between the cost of gasoline 
or airplane fuel to the price of transporting goods and people. An increase in fuel prices means 
higher transport costs and higher airline tickets. As many industrial chemicals are refined from 
oil, higher oil prices hit the manufacturing sector. Rise in the price of oil were largely viewed as 
negative because it increases the price of importing oil and increase costs for the manufacturing 
and transport sectors. This increase of costs could be passed on to the consumer. However now 
that the United States has increased oil production, high oil prices can benefit U.S. oil companies 
and domestic oil industry workers. 
Moreover, energy products are also an important input into the production process for 
most industries. BEA estimates suggest that close to $600 billion of energy was used up as an 
intermediate production input across all private industries in the U.S. in 2013, a slightly larger 
amount than the combined value added from the 4 industries closely related to oil & gas 
extraction listed in Table 8. Lower oil prices are a negative for the oil & gas extraction industry; 
however, they are a positive for most other industries which collectively account for the other 
96.7% of U.S. GDP (Ferley et al., 2015). 
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Table 8: U.S. Current Production in Oil and Gas Related Industries: 2013 
$ Billions % ofGDP 
Gross Value Added 
Oil and gas extraction 291.9 1 .7 
Mining suooort 68.7 0.4 
Pioeline transoortation 21 .0 0.1 
Petroleum and coal refining 169.7 1.0 
Total 551.3 3.3 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, RBC Economic Research 
For oil-importing advanced economies, the price decrease is a welcome stimulus, and 
provides an opportunity to strengthen fiscal resilience against capital outflows for many 
emerging markets. It is important for policy-makers to continue policies that strengthen the long-
term growth potential of their economies. Although futures prices suggest that oil prices will rise 
only moderately over the next four years, it is important to prepare for the fact that oil prices can 
rise in the future just as sharply and unexpectedly as they have fallen in the past (Rogoff, 2016). 
Oil price fluctuations affe.ct inflation through both its energy and the non-energy components. 
One of the most obvious victims of the high oil prices are those who own automobiles and homes. 
However, the injury to consumers go further than just higher automobile fuel and higher home-heating 
costs. Transportation services, including air travel, will likely become more expensive. U.S. households 
purchased about $400 billion worth of gasoline and other fuels, at an annualized rate, over the 
first half of 2014. Each 10% decline in oil prices lowers gasoline prices by about 7%, which 
effectively boosts consumer purchasing power by about $29 billion. As shown in Table 9, they 
assumed 30% drop in oil prices, on average, in 2015 represents a sizeable $86 billion boost to 
household purchasing power. Some of that is saved; however, even adjusting for this, stronger 
consumer spending could provide a boost to U.S. GDP growth of around 0.5 ppts ( �$82 billion). 
There is the possibility that more of the one-time boost to income will be saved but even if only 
half was spent it would still add 0.2- 0.3 ppts to GDP growth (Ferley et al., 2015). 
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Table 9: U.S. Consumer Spending Implications of 30% Oil Price Decline 
$ Bill ions % ofGDP 
Consumer Spending 
Gasoline purchases, annualized HI/ 14 409 2.44 
Savings from reduction in gasoline prices 85.8 0.51 
Less amount saved rather than spent 4.3 0.03 
Total 8 1 .5 0.49 
Assumes: every I 0% decline in oil prices lowers gasoline prices by 7% and a 5% saving rate. 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis RBC Economics Research 
Though the US is the second largest importer of oil, it is also the second largest producer 
of oil and there has been a significant increase in US oil production over the past 5 years, mainly 
due to the use of newer technologies such as fracking. While higher oil prices will hurt 
consumers in terms of decreased savings that are likely to decrease consumption and result in a 
decrease in the GDP, they are also likely to benefit U.S. shale oil producers in the long term -
- who according to estimates need oil prices to be above US $60 to break-even -- and lead to 
higher associated investment. Higher oil prices will also positively affect the profitability of US 
energy companies such as Exxon, Chevron etc. (Srikant, 2015). 
Oil prices do have an impact on the U.S. economy, but it goes two ways because of the 
diversity of industries. High oil prices can drive job creation and investment as it becomes 
economically viable for oil companies to exploit higher-cost shale oil deposits. However, high 
oil prices also hit business and consumers with higher transportation and manufacturing costs. 
Lower oil prices hurt the unconventional oil activity, but benefits manufacturing and other 
sectors where fuel costs are a primary concern (Beattie, 2018). 
I can conclude that there will be both winners and losers after oil prices increase, the 
export revenues will increase in oil-exporting nations (Canada), while oil-importing nations 
(U.S.) will suffer because of the higher oil price. Oil companies will see profits expand, while 
firms that use oil as an input will suffer. Most consumers in oil-importing nations (U.S.) will find 
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their real incomes shrink as they cannot save on transportation and home-heating costs, same but 
less for consumers in oil-exporting nations (Canada), and laborers employed by companies 
directly related to the oil industry will face increasingjob prospects. 
And as many empirical studies, like McCarthy (2007), concluded that the oil price shocks 
affect prices, and that this impact declines along different stages of the distribution process -
importer, producer, and consumer - known as "pricing chain". Following the pricing chain, 
import prices proceed prices, then comes consumer prices allowing for a contemporaneous 
impact of import price shock on producer prices and a contemporaneous impact of producer 
price shock on consumer prices, but not vice versa. 
5.3.2 Impulse Response Function of Exchange Rate Shock for Canada and United States: 
Understanding of exchange rate pass through to prices is of extreme importance for 
several reasons. First, the degree and timing of exchange rate pass through is important for 
understanding inflation dynamics, which is a key issue for central banks. Second, the degree of 
exchange rate pass-through affects the strength of the expenditure-switching effect, which is an 
important channel for the international transmission of country-specific shocks. 
Figure 9 shows the impact of one standard deviation shock, defined as exogenous, 
unexpected, temporary in the exchange rate with a 95 percent confidence level on the pricing 
chain (import prices, producer prices, and consumer prices) in Canada and United States. The 
solid line is the estimated response while the dashed lines denote a two-standard error confidence 
band around the estimate. 
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Figure 9: Impulse Response Function of REER Shock 
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Canada United States 
IMP PP! CPJ JMP PPI CPI 
0.754 -0.139 -0.025 -0.075 -0.155 0.076 
0.697 0.060 0.038 -0.023 -0. 1 1 1  -0.020 
0.2 1 7  0 . 1 03 0.028 -0.288 -0.288 -0. 1 4 1  
-0.042 0.044 0.0 1 0  0.032 0.084 -0.033 
-0.045 0.001 0 -0.048 -0. 1 3 8  0.005 
0.003 -0.005 0 0. 153 0.081 -0.035 
0.010 0 0 0.354 0.472 -0.056 
0 0 0 0.242 0.428 0.024 
0 0 0 -0. 1 1 2  -0.001 0.014 
0 0 0 -0.375 -0.4 10 -0.046 
0 0 0 -0.260 -0.3 1 1  -0.088 
0 0 0 0.078 0.050 -0.0 1 7  
0 0 0 0.217 0.246 0 
Figure 10: Canada (reer shock) 
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It is clear from the figure 9 that the effect of exchange rate shock on import prices and 
producer prices are immediate negative effect, while it is immediate positive effect for consumer 
prices from the first quarter in United States. Based on the number in Table 1 0  the immediate 
effect of a structural one standard deviation shock of exchange rate shock in U.S. is about 0.075 
decrease in the import prices level, 0.1 55 decrease in the producer prices level, and 0.076 
increase in the consumer prices level (almost negligible: take time to have an impact on CPI). 
However, in Canada the effect of exchange rate shock on import prices is immediate positive 
effect from the first quarter, and it is negative effect on producer prices and consumer prices. 
Based on the numbers in Table 1 0  the immediate effect of a structural one standard deviation 
shock of exchange rate shock in Canada is about 0.75 increase in the import price level, 0.14 (or 
14%) decrease in the producer prices level, and 0.025 decrease in the consumer price level. 
Changes in the external value of the currency have direct and indirect effects on prices. 
Consider, for example, the effects associated with an appreciation of the domestic currency (U.S. 
dollar). The direct effects work through two main channels of transmission. First, prices of 
finished goods that are imported into the country become less expensive as a result of the 
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increased purchasing power of the domestic currency. Each dollar buys more foreign currency. 
This change in the relative value of the dollar effectively lowers the dollar price that U.S. 
importers pay for items bought from other countries. Second, prices of imported inputs that are 
used in the domestic production of goods also become less expensive. And that what explained 
the decrease in the import prices in the United States. However, this decrease will not happen in 
Canada, where I have a different case. In Canada contrary to the wide belief, when the value of 
the Lonnie increase, the import prices will increase. This can be explained as following; there is 
a relationship between oil prices and the value of Canadian currency that is when the oil prices 
increase, the Lonnie value will increase. And as I approved before, there is a positive relationship 
between oil prices and import prices, so this relation will explain the increases in import prices 
that comes with the appreciation in the value of the currency till the third quarter, where oil 
shock has more impact than the exchange rate shock. While in the third quarter the exchange rate 
shock has more impact on the import prices that explains the decreases in the import prices from 
the third quarter. 
The decrease in the import prices will decrease the production costs of domestic 
producers who may subsequently pass on these lower costs to consumers via lower prices in 
United States and Canada. However, the timing and magnitude of the overall direct effect of 
ERPTH to consumer prices are uncertain and depend on several factors, including the rate of 
pass-through to import prices, the share of imports in the consumption basket, demand 
conditions, the cost of adjusting prices and perceptions of the duration of the appreciation. Note 
also that prices for services are typically relatively immune to direct ERPTH since they are 
largely domestically oriented and therefore less subject to price pressures emanating from lower 
import costs. 
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Oil is priced in U.S. dollars on the world market, so oil prices correlate strongly with the 
value of the dollar. Oil has perennially been the largest U.S. import, accounting for 10.5 percent 
of the dollar value of all imports in 2014. In 2015, oil fell from the top spot, decreasing 4.5 
percent because of falling global oil prices and a decreasing volume of overall imports. In total, 
import oil prices fell 43.7 percent and the volume of imports decreased by 9.7 percent in 
2015. The strong U.S. dollar helped push West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil prices down to 
$37. 13  a barrel on December 3 1 ;  the price represented a 30-percent drop from 2014. Oil prices 
fell in 2015 from other factors as well, such as increases in global oil production and 
improvements in hydraulic fracturing in the United States (Reed, 2016). 
ERPTH can also have indirect effects on consumer prices through changes in the 
composition of demand and the levels of aggregate demand and wages. Following an 
appreciation in the currency, demand for domestic goods falls both at home and abroad. This is 
because lower prices for imported goods create a decrease in demand for domestically produced 
substitutes, while expensive prices for domestic exports in turn decrease foreign demand for such 
goods. Lower demand for domestic goods puts additional pressures on domestic prices. Finally, 
the decrease in demand for domestic goods will, eventually, lead to lower demand for labor and 
thus to lowering wages, in turn, could also be reflected in lower prices. 
5.3.3 Estimation of Pass Through rates of Exchange Rate in Canada and United States: 
The exchange rate pass-through could be defined as the percentage change in local 
currency import prices resulting from a one percent change in the exchange rate between the 
exporting and importing countries (Goldberg and Knetter, 1 997). A change in import prices 
affects retail and consumer prices. When exchange-rate pass-through is greater, there is more 
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transmission of inflation between countries. Exchange-rate pass-through is also related to the law 
of one price and purchasing power parity (Campa and Goldberg, 2001 ). 
Exchange rate pass-through has thus been considered an important macroeconomic 
instrument that could help in ensuring low levels of inflation rate and a stable financial system. 
This section describes the data and the methodology used to estimate the exchange rate pass-
through to consumer prices. I use a separate sample for each country from 1980 to 2017. 
For each country, I estimate the following pass-through equation: 
.!\CPI = oo+ 0 1 6CPI1-1 + 02 6 (reer + FCPI) + 03 6 (reer1-1 + FCPI1- 1)  + 04 6 (reer1-2 + FCPI1-2) 
The variables CPI, reer, and FCPI are the quarterly consumer price index, real effective 
exchange rate, and foreign consumer price index respectively. The coefficients 02, 03, and 04 
represent the immediate, one quarter lag and two-quarter lag impact of an exchange rate change 
or foreign price level change on the consumer price level, respectively. The equation 
incorporates lagged adjustment of adjustment of inflation to shocks, so that (02 + 03 + 04)/(l-01) 
measures the long-run pass-through of exchange rate movements to overall inflation. 
Table 1 1 :  The Lonsz-Run Rates of Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
Countrv Exchange Rate Pass-Through 
Canada 0.20 
USA 0.27 
Source: Authors' calculations based on the outcomes of the SV AR model 
Table 1 1  reports for each country regression the long-run rates of exchange rate pass-
through for the entire period. The pass-through estimates are incomplete (less than one) for 
Canada and United States. Incomplete pass-through seems to be common across countries 
indicating that consumer prices increase less than the depreciation of the exchange rate. 
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The pass-through rate range is between zero and one, when pass-through equal one that 
implies producer currency pricing and full pass-through, and when pass-through equal zero that 
implies local currency pricing and zero pass-through (Sutherland, 2005). 
In theory, there are at least two potential reasons for pass-through ratios being greater 
than one (An and Wang, 201 1 ). First, the decline of import demand caused by the depreciation of 
importer's currency can increase the producer's cost in the case of increasing returns to scale. As 
a result, import prices can increase more than the depreciation of the exchange rate. Second, 
exchange rate pass-through also depends on the demand elasticity. If the elasticity declines with 
output, the optimal markup charged by monopolistic supplier increases following a depreciation 
of the importer's currency. As a result, the exchange rate pass-through ratio can be greater than 
one. Also, Recent theoretical work has suggested a number of potentially important factors in 
causing incomplete pass-through of exchange rates to prices, including markup adjustment, local 
costs and barriers to price adjustment (Nakamura and Zerom, 2009). 
The degree of exchange rate pass-through for Canada is less than U.S., where the long­
run rate of exchange rate pass-through for Canada is 0.20, suggesting that on average a one 
percent depreciation in the local currency value causes consumer prices to rise by 20% in the 
long-run, while in the U.S. the long run of exchange rate pass-through is 0.27, suggesting that on 
average a one percent depreciation in the local currency value causes consumer prices to rise by 
27% in the long-run, and that can be explained by low-inflation environment, which induced by 
a shift in monetary policy, results in a decline in the degree of pass-through of exchange rate 
movements to consumer prices in Canada. 
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5.3.4 Estimation of Pass Through rates of Oil Prices in Canada and United States: 
The pass-through rate of oil prices can be defined as percentage responses of domestic 
prices to a percentage change in oil prices (Shioji and Uchino, 2010). 
A number of authors have documented declines in the "pass-through rate" of oil prices 
both for the U.S. and elsewhere in the world. This finding is considered to be important, not only 
for the relevance of the subject per se, but also because it is believed to have great influence on 
how we understand working of our nation economies. In the literature, there are three popular 
hypotheses on what has caused the decline in the pass-through rate. First is increased credibility 
of monetary policy: when domestic sellers of oil-related products expect that the central bank 
will try to suppress inflation by raising the interest rate as soon as it sees rising oil prices, they 
will hesitate to pass the increased cost onto prices of their own goods. Second is increased wage 
flexibility. Oil price surges, in the long run, should lower profitability of firms and induce them 
to cut their production and wage payments. If wages start decreasing fast, firms will find less 
reason to raise prices. The third explanation is related to the cost structure. It is believed that, 
after the painful experiences of the 1 970s and the early 1 980s, firms have learned the danger of 
depending too much on oil. They have thus transformed their production structure into a less oil 
intensive one, and thus is less needing to change their prices in response to fluctuations in oil 
prices (Shioji and Uchino, 2010). 
This section describes the data and the methodology used to estimate the pass-through 
rates of oil prices. I use a separate sample for each country from 1980 to 2017. 
For each country, I estimate the following pass-through equation: 
6PPI = oo + 01 6PPI1-1 + 02 6 (Oil + PPI) + 03 6 (Oilt-1 + PPI1-1) + 04 6 (Oil1-2 + PPI1-2) 
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The variables oil and PPI are the quarterly oil prices and producer price index respectively. The 
coefficients 02, 03, and 04 represent the immediate, one quarter Jag and two-quarter Jag impact of 
an oil price change on the producer price level, respectively. The equation incorporates lagged 
adjustment of adjustment of inflation to shocks, so that (Oi + 03 + 04)/ (1  - 01) measures the long-
run pass-through of oil price movements to producer prices level. 
Table 1 2 :  The Long-Run Pass-Through Rates of Oil Price 
Country Pass-Through Rate 
Canada 0.04 
USA 0.25 
Source: Authors' calculations based on the outcomes of the SY AR model 
Table 12 reports for each country regression the long-run pass-through rates of oil prices 
for the entire period. The pass-through estimates are incomplete (less than one) for both 
countries indicating that producer prices increase less than the appreciation of the oil prices. 
In theory, the first-round effects of oil price changes on consumer inflation, which occur 
rapidly, emerge through the prices of energy items such as motor fuels and bottled gas. 
Meanwhile, the pass-through to other energy prices, such as natural gas and electricity, occurs 
with a lag. On the other hand, the notion of indirect effects is defined as the pass-through of oil 
price changes to consumer prices via production costs and it talces time to emerge. The impact of 
fuel prices on the prices of transport services, such as local transportation, courier services and 
aviation, are examples to such effects. Indirect effects can also work through import prices. 
Second-round effects on the other hand refer to the notion that the first-round price changes may 
cause a revision of the inflation expectations and nominal wages, which in turn leads to inflation 
(Akcelik and Ogunc, 201 6). 
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The degree of oil price pass-through for Canada is less than U.S., where the long-run rate 
of oil price pass-through for Canada is 0.04, suggesting that on average a one percent 
appreciation in oil prices causes producer prices to rise by 4% in the long-run, while in the U.S. 
the long run of oil price pass-through is 0.25, suggesting that on average a one percent 
appreciation in oil prices causes producer prices to rise by 25% in the long-run. Although both 
countries are neighbors and industrial countries, that is not surprising for a main reason. 
Basically, Canada is an oil exporting country while U.S. is an importing one. 
5.3.5 Variance Decomposition: 
Table 1 3 :  Variance Decomposition for U.S. 
Impulse Response Response Response 
Oil Prices IMP 0.61 PPI 0.53 CPI 
Interest Rate IMP 0 PPI 0 CPI 
Output Gap IMP 0 PPI 0.01 CPI 
REER IMP 0 PPI 0 CPI 
IMP IMP 0.39 PPI 0.27 CPI 
PPI IMP 0 PPI 0 . 1 9  CPI 
CPI IMP 0 PPI 0 CPI 









The variance decomposition of the SV AR model are shown in Table 1 3  in order to 
further analyze the transmission channels of pass-through rates of exchange rate and oil prices 
for U.S. By the 1 2  quarters, oil price shocks explain 61 % of the variation in import prices, and 
39% of the variation in import prices is explained by its own shock. Oil price shocks account for 
53% of the variation in producer prices. Import prices explains 27% of the variation in producer 
prices, and 19% of the variation in producer prices is explained by its own shock. These results 
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support that the direct exchange rate pass through channel (i.e. import price changes to producer 
prices) is  stronger than indirect channel (i.e. exchange rate changes to producer prices) in U.S. 
Moreover, the consumer price shocks explain 84% of its variation which indicates that 
the own price (CPI) shocks are the most important in explaining its variation. Regarding the 
variance of CPI, exchange rate shocks appear to be more prominent than oil prices shocks and 
import prices change in explaining the variation in CPL The exchange rate shocks accounts for 
7% of the variation in CPI against 4% explained by oil prices shocks and 2% explained by 
import price changes by 1 2  quarters. Hence, the results suggest that the indirect exchange rate 
pass through channel of exchange rate changes to consumer prices is more pronounced than 
another direct channel in U.S. 
Table 14: Variance Decomposition for Canada 
Impulse Response Response Response 
Oil Prices IMP 0.02 PPI 0.04 CPI 0.06 
Interest Rate IMP 0 PPI 0 CPI 0.01 
Output Gap IMP 0.02 PPI 0.02 CPI 0.13 
REER IMP 0.03 PPI 0.02 CPI 0.01 
IMP IMP 0.93 PPI 0 CPI 0 
PPI IMP 0 PPI 0.93 CPI 0 
CPI IMP 0 PPI 0 CPI 0.79 
Total I I I 
The Variance decomposition of the SVAR model are shown in Table 1 4  in order to 
further analyze the transmission channels of pass-through rates of exchange rate and oil prices 
for Canada. By the 12  quarters, oil price and output gap explain 2% for each of the variation in 
import prices, and 3% of the variation in import prices is explained by exchange rate shocks. 
Moreover, 93% of the variation in import prices is explained by its own shock. Oil prices shocks 
49 
account for 4% of the variation in producer prices, output gap and exchange rate shocks explain 
2% of the variation in producer prices for each, and 93% of the variation in producer prices I 
explained by its own shocks. These results support that the indirect exchange rate pass-through 
channel (i.e. exchange rate changes to producer prices) is stronger than direct channel (i.e. import 
prices change to producer prices) in Canada. 
Moreover, the consumer price shocks explain 79% of its variation which indicates that 
the own price (CPI) shocks are the most important in explaining its variation. Exchange rate and 
interest rate shocks account for 1 % of the variation in consumer prices for each. Oil price shocks 
explain 6% of the variation in consumer prices, and 13% of the variation in consumer prices is 
explained by output gap. Hence, the results suggest that the indirect exchange rate pass through 
channel of exchange rate changes to consumer prices is more pronounced than another direct 
channel in Canada. 
I can conclude that oil prices shocks are the most important cause behind the increases in 
the import prices and producer prices in U.S. comparing with the exchange rate shocks, where 
the exchange rate shocks have more impact in the consumer prices comparing with the oil prices 
shocks. However, the opposite case in Canada, the exchange rate shocks have more impact on 
import prices comparing with the oil prices shocks, where the oil shocks have more impact in the 
producer prices and consumer prices comparing with the exchange rate shocks. 
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6. Conclusion: 
This paper estimates exchange rate pass-through and oil price pass-through to import 
prices, producer prices, and consumer prices for both Canada and United States using a 
Structural Vector Auto-Regression model. 
My results are supportive of partial exchange rate pass-through and oil price pass-through 
for Canada and United States, where the exchange rate pass-through for Canada is 0.20 and for 
United States is 0.27; the oil price pass-through for Canada is 0.04 and for United States is 0.25. 
Also, the magnitudes of pass-through ratios are broadly in line with previous literature. 
The extent of oil prices pass-through rates declines along the distribution chain. The 
average oil price pass-through ratios of import prices, producer prices, and consumer prices are 
0.713, 0.1 98, and 0.079, respectively for Canada, while for United States the ratios are 1 .860, 
1 .798, and 0.1 08, respectively. However, the exchange rate pass-through did not decline along 
the pricing chain. Exchange rate pass-through ratios of import prices, producer prices, and 
consumer prices are 0.754, -0.139, and -0.025, respectively for Canada, while for United States 
the ratios are -0.075, -0. 1 55, and 0.076, respectively. 
Moreover, from the variance decomposition results, I find that Oil prices shocks are the 
most important cause behind the increases in the import prices and producer prices in U.S. 
comparing with the exchange rate shocks, where the exchange rate shocks have more impact in 
the consumer prices comparing with the oil prices shocks. However, the opposite case in Canada, 
the exchange rate shocks have more impact on import prices comparing with the oil prices 
shocks, where the oil shocks have more impact in the producer prices and consumer prices 
comparing with the exchange rate shocks. 
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Furthermore, it is found that, a greater pass-through coefficient is associated with an 
economy with a higher import share, more persistent and less volatile exchange rate, less stable 
monetary policy environment, and higher inflation rate. 
An interesting extension to my analysis would be to estimate the exchange rate pass­
through and oil price pass-through to the rest of G7 countries (Italy, France, United Kingdom, 
Germany, and Japan), and to investigate the rule of the monetary policy in reducing the pass­
through to the aggregate prices. In addition to identify other shocks such as demand (output gap), 
monetary, and productivity shocks, that drive the fluctuations in aggregate prices. 
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Appendix A: 
Table 2:  Data sources and Description 
Variable Description Source 
Oil Price Global price of Brent Crude, U.S. Dollars per barrel, International Monetary Fund 
Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted (IMF) 
Exchange Real Effective Exchange Rates Based on Manufacturing Organization for Economic Co-
Rate Consumer Price Index, Index 2010=1, Quarterly, Not operation and Development 
Seasonally Adjusted (OECD) 
Consumer Consumer Price Index of All Items, Index 20 I O- J 00, Organization for Economic Co-
Prices Index Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted operation and Development 
(OECD) 
Interest Rate 3-Month or 90-day Rates and Yields: Interbank Rates, Organization for Economic Co-
Percent, Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted operation and Development 
(OECD) 
Import Price Import Price Index: All commodities, Index 2000= I 00, U. S. Bureau of 
Index Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted Labor Statistics 
(no Italy) 
Producer Producer Prices lndex: Index 20 l O= I ,  Quarterly, Not Organization for Economic Co-
Prices lndex Seasonally Adjusted operation and Development 
(OECD) 
GDP Gross Domestic Product, Quarterly, Seasonally Adjusted U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Output Gap Calculate as following: 
Output Gap= Actual GDP - Potential GDP. 
FCPI for Canada = (90% CPI USA + 4% CPI China + 3% CPI UK+ 2% CPI Japan+ 1 % CPI 
Mexico). 
FCPI for France = (24% CPI Germany + 13% CPI Italy + 1 1 .5% CPI Spain + 9.4% CPI UK + 
12.4% CPI Belgium + 8.7% CPI USA + 6.4% CPI Netherlands + 3.6% CPI Switzerland + 7% CPI 
China + 4% CPI Russia). 
FCPI for Germany = (13% CPI USA + 13% CPI France + 7% CPI U K +  13% CPI Netherlands+ 
Foreign 13% CPI China + 9% CPI Italy + 8% CPI Australia + 8% CPI Poland + 7% CPI Switzerland + 6% 
Consumer CPI Belgium + 3% CPI Czech Republic). 
Prices Index FCPI for Italy = (24% CPI Germany + 16% CPI France + 1 1% CPI USA + 8% CPI UK + 9% CPI 
Spain + 6.4% CPI Switzerland + 7% CPI Belgium + 2.3% CPI Poland + 8% CPI China + 6% CPI 
Netherlands + 2.3% CPI Russia). 
FCPI for Japan = (24% CPI USA + 33% CPI China + 8.6% CPI South Korea + 5% CPI Germany 
+ 5% CPI Australia + 1 .7% CPI UK + 2.2% CPI Indonesia). 
FCPl for UK = ( I  9% CPI Germany + 17% CPI USA + 1 1  % CPI China + I %  CPI Netherland + 
9% CPI France + 7% CPI Belgium + 6% CPI Switzerland + 6% CPI Ireland + 5% CPI Italy + 5% 
CPI Spain + 3% CPI Norway + 3% CPI Canada). 
FCPI for USA = (30% CPI China + 26% CPI Mexico + 27% CPI Canada + 9% CPI Japan+ 8% 
CPI Germany). 
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Table 3 :  Unit Root Test 
Test Statistic 
Variables Canada France Germany Italy 
Level I 51Difference Level 1 stDifference Level 151Difference Level 151Difference 
Oil Price - 1 .542 -8.220 -1 .542 -8.220 -1 .542 -8.220 -1 .542 -8.085 
REER -2.228 -9.781 -2.228 -9.781 -2.126 -8.920 -1 .869 -8.652 
Inflation -4.627 -4.626 -8.160 -3.278 
Interest Rate - 1 .756 -9.834 -1 .246 - 1 0.055 - 1 . 1 2 1  -7.421 -0.894 -10.140 
IMP - 1 . 3 1 6  -7.208 -1 .752 -4.029 -1 .752 -4.029 
PPI -0.91 8  -7.604 -1 .996 -3.889 -1 .996 -3.889 - 1 .565 -6.308 
Outout Gao -2. 1 04 -6.257 
GDP - 1 . 8 1 7  -5.973 0 . 157 -9.757 -2.960 -6.993 
Note: Critical values for the test statistics are: -3 .5 at I%, -2. 9 at 5%, and -2.6 at I 0% 
Table 3: Unit Root Test 
Test Statistic 
Variables Japan United Kingdom United States 
Level 1 srnifference Level I 51Difference Level 151Difference 
Oil Prices - 1 .542 -8.085 - 1 .542 -8.220 -1 .542 -8.220 
REER -1 .869 -8.652 - 1 .754 -9.659 -1 .754 -9.659 
Inflation -3.278 -1 1 . 1 45 -1 1 . 145 
Interest Rate -0.894 -10.140 -2.008 -10.014 -2.008 -10.014 
IMP - 1 .231  -4.861 -2.433 -4.696 - 1 .2 1 6  -8.156 
PPI - 1 . 1 86 -8.933 - 1 .701 -7.287 -0.337 -8. l 01  
Outout Gao -3.082 -5.798 - l .928 -3.529 4.372 -6.749 
GDP 
Note: Critical values for the test statistics are: -3.5 at 1%, -2.9 at 5%, and -2.6 at 10% 
Table 4: AIC for Different Lag Estimation of SV AR Model 
Lags Canada Japan UK USA France Germany Italy 
0 1 4 . 1 5  1 1 .97 16.66 26.40 27.97 0.09 -0.06 
I 12.61 * 10.40* 1 6.40 25.80 26.37 - 1 . 4 1  * -1 .44* 
2 12.96 10.60 14.02 25.85 26.53 -0.89 - 1 . 1 5  
3 13.08 10.63 1 1 .30 26.04 26.47 -0.38 - 1 . 1 2  
4 12.88 10.66 -94.60* 25.62* 24.58* -1 .26 - 1 . 1 6  
Table 1 I : The Long-Run Rates of Exchange Rate Pass-Through 






UK 1 . 1 8  
USA 0.27 
Source: Authors' calculations based on the outcomes of the SVAR model 
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Table 1 2 :  The Lont?,-Run Pass-Through Rates of Oil Price 
Country Pass-Throu�h Rate 
Canada 0.04 
France 0 . 1 5  
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Figure 1 5 :  Impulse Response Function of Oil Price and Exchange Rate Shocks for Japan 
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Figure 20: Japan (oil shock) 
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Figure 21 :  Japan (reer shock) 
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Figure 15 shows the impact of o a one standard deviation shock, defined as exogenous, 
unexpected, temporary in the oil prices and exchange rates with a 95 percent confidence level on 
the pricing chain (import prices, producer prices, and consumer prices) in Japan. The solid line is 
the estimated response while the dashed lines denote a two-standard error confidence band 
around the estimate. 
It is clear from figure 20 that the effect of an oil price shock on import prices, producer 
prices, and consumer prices in Japan is immediate positive effect from the first quarter. Based on 
the numbers in Table 14, the immediate effect of a structural one standard deviation shock of oil 
prices shock to import prices is about 0.04 increase in the import prices level, to producer prices 
is about 0.27 increase in the producer prices, and to consumer prices is about 0. 1 6  increase in the 
consumer prices. Thus, I can say that the pass-through in Japan is larger for IMP than for the PPI 
and CPI. 
Moreover, it is shown from the figure 21 that the effect of exchange rate shock on import 
prices, producer prices, and consumer prices in Japan is immediate negative effect from the first 
quarter. Based on the numbers in Table 14, the immediate effect of a structural one standard 
deviation shock of exchange rate shock to import prices is about 0.19 decrease in the import 
prices level, to producer prices is about 0.04 decrease in the producer prices, and to consumer 
prices is about 0.05 decrease in the consumer prices. Thus, I can say that the pass-through in 
Japan is larger for IMP than for the PPI and CPI. 
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Figure 16:  Impulse Response Function of Oil Price and Exchange Rate Shocks for UK 
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Table 16 :  Jmoulse Resoonse Function for UK 
Oil  Price Shock Exchan2e Rate Shock 
Step IMP PPI CPI IMP PPI CPI 
0 2.057 -0. 1 70 0. 1 4 1  -0. 128 - 1 .7 19  0.054 
I 2.026 -3.013 0.327 0.575 1 .893 -0.041 
2 -0.081 0.256 0.071 0.087 1 .852 -0.042 
3 -0. 7 1 1  -0.551 -0.085 0.028 0.416 -0.047 
4 -0.452 -0.372 -0.063 -0.065 0.330 -0.034 
5 -0.002 -0.341 0 -0.032 0.008 -0.020 
6 0.147 -0.109 0.029 -0.0 1 1  -0.022 0 
7 0.091 -0.015 0.02 1 0 -0.059 0 
8 0.002 0.024 0 0 -0.043 0 
9 -0.029 0.014 0 0 -0.033 0 
1 0  -0.01 7  0 0 0 -0.020 0 
1 I 0 0 0 0 -0.0 1 1  0 
1 2  0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Figure 16 shows the impact of o a one standard deviation shock, defined as exogenous, 
unexpected, temporary in the oil prices and exchange rates with a 95 percent confidence level on 
the pricing chain (import prices, producer prices, and consumer prices) in United Kingdom. The 
solid line is the estimated response while the dashed lines denote a two-standard error confidence 
band around the estimate. 
It is clear from figure 22 that the effect of an oil price shock on import prices and 
consumer prices in UK is immediate positive effect from the first quarter, while the effect of an 
oil price shock is immediate negative for the producer prices. Based on the numbers in Table 15, 
the immediate effect of a structural one standard deviation shock of oil prices shock to import 
prices is about 2.06 increase in the import prices level, to producer prices is about 0. 1 7  decrease 
in the producer prices, and to consumer prices is about 0.14 increase in the consumer prices. 
Thus, I can say that the pass-through in United Kingdom is larger for IMP than for the PPI and 
CPL 
Moreover, it is shown from the figure 23 that the effect of exchange rate shock on import 
prices and producer prices in UK is immediate negative effect from the first quarter, while the 
effect of an exchange rate shock is immediate positive for the consumer prices. Based on the 
numbers in Table 15, the immediate effect of a structural one standard deviation shock of 
exchange rate shock to import prices is about 0. 13  decrease in the import prices level, to 
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producer prices is about 1 .  72 decrease in the producer prices, and to consumer prices is about 
0.05 increase in the consumer prices. 
Figure 17:  Impulse Response Function of Oil Price and Exchange Rate Shocks for France 
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Table 17 :  Impulse Response Function for France 
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PPI CPI IMP PPJ CPI 
0.439 0.129 -0.250 0.207 0.051 
0.342 0.085 -0.296 -0. 1 1 1  0.0 1 5  
0.026 0.025 -0.189 -0.023 -0.012 
0.497 0.175 -0.058 0.126 -0.007 
0.0 1 7  0.133 0.036 0.078 0.072 
-0.450 -0.022 0.066 0.031 0.017 
-0.712  -0. 1 56 -0.008 -0.075 -0.037 
-0.537 0.054 -0.005 -0.144 -0.025 
-0.5 1 7  0.057 -0.009 -0.227 0.034 
0.01 1 0.004 0.006 -0.145 -0.002 
0.605 -0.022 0.028 0.012 -0.023 
0.349 0.126 0.021 0. 1 13 0.007 
-0.266 0 0 0.019 0.032 
Figure 24: France (oil shock) 
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Figure 25: France (reer shock) 
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Figure 1 7  shows the impact of o a one standard deviation shock, defined as exogenous, 
unexpected, temporary in the oil prices and exchange rates with a 95 percent confidence level on 
the pricing chain (import prices, producer prices, and consumer prices) in France. The solid line 
is the estimated response while the dashed lines denote a two-standard error confidence band 
around the estimate. 
It is clear from figure 24 that the effect of an oil price shock on import prices in France is 
immediate negative effect from the first quarter, while the effect of an oil price shock is 
immediate positive for the producer prices and consumer prices. Based on the numbers in Table 
16, the immediate effect of a structural one standard deviation shock of oil prices shock to import 
prices is about 0.19 decrease in the import prices level, to producer prices is about 0.44 increase 
in the producer prices, and to consumer prices is about 0. 1 3  increase in the consumer prices. 
Moreover, it is shown from the figure 25 that the effect of exchange rate shock on import 
prices in France is immediate negative effect from the first quarter, while the effect of an 
exchange rate shock is immediate positive for producer prices and consumer prices. Based on the 
numbers in Table 16, the immediate effect of a structural one standard deviation shock of 
exchange rate shock to import prices is about 0.25 decrease in the import prices level, to 
producer prices is about 0.21 increase in the producer prices, and to consumer prices is about 
0.05 increase in the consumer prices. 
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Figure 1 8 :  Impulse Response Function of Oil Price and Exchange Rate Shocks for Germany 
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Table 18:  Impulse Response Function for Germany 
Oil Price Shock Exchange Rate Shock 
Step IMP 
0 0.344 
I 0.2 1 5  
2 0. 1 02 
3 -0.094 
4 -0. 1 7 1  





1 0  0.0 1 8  
1 I 0 
1 2  0 
.... , , ' ' ' ' ' ' . ' 
\ 
\ 
PPI CPI IMP PPI CPI 
0.356 0.186 0.221 -0. 130 0.023 
0.513 0.102 0.5 16 -0. 129 -0.0 16 
0.370 0.037 0. 1 7 1  -0.01 1 0.030 
0.162 0.006 0.050 0.023 0.025 
-0.015 -0.0 1 7  0.038 0.009 0.010 
-0.102 -0.026 0.0 1 8  -0.006 0 
-0. 1 00 -0.020 0 -0.014 0 
-0.052 0 0 -0.015 0 
0 0 0 -0.010 0 
0.029 0 0 0 0 
0.032 0 0 0 0 
0.020 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
Figure 26: Germany (oil shock) 
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Figure 27: Germany (reer shock) 
6 8 10 12 
- Germany lMP _ .. _. Germany PPI - - Germany CPI 
14 
Figure 1 8  shows the impact of o a one standard deviation shock, defined as exogenous, 
unexpected, temporary in the oil prices and exchange rates with a 95 percent confidence level on 
the pricing chain (import prices, producer prices, and consumer prices) in Germany. The solid 
line is the estimated response while the dashed lines denote a two-standard error confidence band 
around the estimate. 
It is clear from figure 26 that the effect of an oil price shock on import prices, producer 
prices, and consumer prices in Germany is immediate positive effect from the first quarter. Based 
on the numbers in Table 1 7, the immediate effect of a structural one standard deviation shock of 
oil prices shock to import prices is about 0.34 increase in the import prices level, to producer 
prices is about 0.36 increase in the producer prices, and to consumer prices is about 0. 19 increase 
in the consumer prices. 
Moreover, it is shown from the figure 27 that the effect of exchange rate shock on import 
prices and consumer prices in Germany is immediate positive effect from the first quarter, while 
the effect of an exchange rate shock is immediate negative effect for producer prices. Based on 
the numbers in Table 1 7, the immediate effect of a structural one standard deviation shock of 
exchange rate shock to import prices is about 0.22 increase in the import prices level, to producer 
prices is about 0.13 decrease in the producer prices, and to consumer prices is about 0.02 
increase in the consumer prices. Thus, I can say that the exchange rate pass-through in United 









Figure 19: Impulse Response Function of Oil Price and Exchange Rate Shocks for Italy 
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Table 19 :  Impulse Response Function for Italy 
Oil Price Shock Exchange Rate Shock 
Steo PPI CPI PPI CPI 
0 0.603 0.150 -0. 1 4 1  -0.062 
1 0.445 0.129 -0. 148 -0.081 
2 0.221 0.091 -0.054 -0.057 
3 0.069 0.057 0.005 -0.033 
4 0 0.035 0.020 -0.019 
5 -0.019 0.022 0.014 -0.012 
6 -0.01 6  0.014 0 0 
7 0 0.010 0 0 
8 0 0 0 0 
9 0 0 0 0 
1 0  0 0 0 0 
1 1  0 0 0 0 


























Figure 28: Italy (oil shock) 
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Figure 19 shows the impact of o a one standard deviation shock, defined as exogenous, 
unexpected, temporary in the oil prices and exchange rates with a 95 percent confidence level on 
the pricing chain (import prices, producer prices, and consumer prices) in Italy. The solid line is 
the estimated response while the dashed lines denote a two-standard error confidence band 
around the estimate. 
It is clear from figure 28 that the effect of an oil price shock on producer prices and 
consumer prices in Italy is immediate positive effect from the first quarter. Based on the numbers 
in Table 1 8, the immediate effect of a structural one standard deviation shock of oil prices shock 
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to producer prices is about 0.60 increase in the producer prices level, and to consumer prices is 
about 0. 1 5  increase in the consumer prices. Thus, I can say that the pass-through rates of oil 
prices shock in Italy is larger for PPI than for CPI. 
Moreover, it is shown from the figure 29 that the effect of exchange rate shock on 
producer prices and consumer prices in Italy is immediate negative effect from the first quarter. 
Based on the numbers in Table 1 8, the immediate effect of a structural one standard deviation 
shock of exchange rate shock to producer prices is about 0. 1 4  decrease in the producer prices 
level, and to consumer prices is about 0.06 decrease in the consumer prices. Thus, I can say that 
the exchange rate pass-through in Italy is larger for PPI than for CPL 
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